

ATLAS

PLANNING GROUP

PLANNING STATEMENT

OAK MEADOW

BISHOPS WOOD ROAD

MISLINGFORD

PO17 5AT

NOVEMBER 2024

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Appendix A - Written Ministerial Statement (July 2024)

Appendix B - Michael Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council [2017]

INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 This Statement has been produced by Atlas Planning Group in support of an application seeking full planning permission for the demolition of one (Use Class C3) converted barn, caravan, agricultural building (with extant consent for residential conversion) and erection of three detached dwellings with associated hard and soft landscaping at Oak Meadow, Misingford, PO17 5AT.
- 1.2 The Statement will assess the development proposals in the context of national and local planning policy found within the National Planning Policy Framework (2023) and Winchester City Council's Development Plan Documents respectively.

SITE DESCRIPTION

- 2.1 The application site is located on the south west side of Bishops Wood Road within the hamlet of Misingford. The site comprises one Use Class C3 converted barn, caravan and one agricultural building (with extant consent for two C3 dwellings). The area contains a mixture of residential and agricultural sites, where there is a loose grain of development with dwellings set in generous plots of land.



Figure 1 - Aerial view of application site

RELEVANT PLANNING HISTORY

3.1 The planning history for the application site is as follows:

PRIOR APPROVAL - 15/02745/PNCOU

3.2 In November 2015, an application seeking prior approval for the change of use of an existing agricultural building to one C3 dwellinghouse was submitted to Winchester City Council.

3.3 Prior approval was approved in January 2016.




Figure 2 - Approved south west elevation (15/02745/PNCOU)




Figure 3 - Approved north east elevation (15/02745/PNCOU)

PRIOR APPROVAL - 24/01837/PNACOU

3.1 In August 2024, a prior approval application seeking the change of use and conversion of an agricultural building to form two dwellings was submitted to Winchester City Council.

3.2 Prior approval was granted in October 2024.




Figure 4 - Approved north west elevation (24/01837/PNACOU)




Figure 5 - Approved south east elevation (24/01837/PNACOU)

THE PROPOSAL

4.1 The description of development is as follows:

“Demolition of existing (Use Class C3) converted barn, caravan, agricultural building and the erection of three detached dwellinghouses with associated hard and soft landscaping”

4.2 The proposals seek to demolish the (Use Class C3) converted barn, caravan, agricultural building (with extant consent for residential conversion) and erect three detached dwellings in replacement. The new family homes have been designed utilising materials that reflect the local vernacular, in a traditional style, appropriate for the rural setting. The elevational facade for each dwellinghouse will comprise differing materials to be coherent with and retain the relationship with the residential properties located on Bishops Wood Road.

4.3 The established entry point off Bishops Wood Road will remain as existing. Closeboard fencing will separate the genuinely usable private gardens and the layout of the site will allow for the parking of ten vehicles. The street frontage will benefit from new native tree planting to soften the family homes into the verdant setting.




Figure 6 - Proposed site plan

4.4 The material palette has been carefully considered. Unit 1 will comprise red brick under a slate tiled roof. Unit 2 will feature brick and flint under a clay tiled roof to be in-keeping with Flint Cottage 40 metres east of the site. Likewise, Unit 3 will comprise brickwork under a slate roof. Overall, the proposals have been thoughtfully designed to facilitate continuity and sit seamlessly within the street scene.




Figure 7 - Proposed Unit 1 south and east and north east elevations




Figure 8 - Proposed Unit 2 south east and north east elevations



Figure 9 - Proposed Unit 3 south east and north east elevations




Figure 10 - Proposed street scene

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

- 5.1 Winchester City Council's Adopted Local Plan Parts 1 and 2 are the Council's primary Development Plan Documents, and the starting point for determining planning decisions within the Borough, in accordance with Section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004.
- 5.2 The National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) provides a national tier of policy and decision-making guidance for the planning system and is a material consideration for all planning decisions.
- 5.3 The policies and guidance contained within the statutory DPDs and all other relevant material considerations have been reviewed to ensure that the proposal is an appropriate form of development for the site.
- 5.4 At the heart of the NPPF is a presumption in favour of sustainable development. Paragraph 11 of the NPPF requires proposals that accord with the Development Plan to be approved without delay.

PRINCIPLE OF DEVELOPMENT

- 5.5 Policy DM1 of the Winchester Local Plan Part 1 states:

"Development that accords with the Development Plan will be permitted within the defined boundaries of the following settlements, as shown on the Policies Map:

Bishop's Waltham, Colden Common, Compton Down, Denmead, Hursley, Kings Worthy, Knowle, Littleton, Micheldever, Micheldever Station, New Alresford, Old Alresford, Otterbourne, South Wonston, Southdown, Southwick, Sparsholt, Sutton Scotney, Swanmore, Waltham Chase, Whiteley, Wickham, Winchester Town.

Limited infilling will also be permitted in other settlements listed under Policy MTRA3 in the circumstances outlined in that policy.

Outside of these areas, countryside policies will apply and only development appropriate to a countryside location will be permitted, as specified in Policies MTRA4, MTRA5, DM10 – DM13, etc".

- 5.6 Policy MTRA4 of the Winchester Local Plan Part 1 states:

“In the countryside, defined as land outside the built-up areas of Winchester, Whiteley and Waterlooville and the settlements covered by MTRA 2 and 3 above, the Local Planning Authority will only permit the following types of development:

- *development which has an operational need for a countryside location, such as for agriculture, horticulture or forestry; or*
- *proposals for the reuse of existing rural buildings for employment, tourist accommodation, community use or affordable housing (to meet demonstrable local housing needs). Buildings should be of permanent construction and capable of use without major reconstruction; or*
- *expansion or redevelopment of existing buildings to facilitate the expansion on-site of established businesses or to meet an operational need, provided development is proportionate to the nature and scale of the site, its setting and countryside location; or*
- *small scale sites for low key tourist accommodation appropriate to the site, location and the setting”.*

5.7 The application site lies within the countryside, as defined by the adopted policies map and it is acknowledged that none of the exception criteria within Policy MTRA4 are met. As such, there is a direct in-principal conflict with the development. However, in accordance with S38 (6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, a decision which is contrary to the provisions of the development plan can be made where material considerations may indicate otherwise.

HOUSING LAND SUPPLY

5.8 In 2022, the Annual Monitoring report for Winchester showed that the Council can demonstrate a 7.6 year supply of deliverable housing for 2024-2029. With the amendments to paragraph 226 of the revised NPPF (2023), the Council only need to demonstrate a four-year supply due to them having a Local Plan at Regulation 19 Stage. Given the Council can demonstrate a four-year housing land supply and have a delivery measurement above 75%, the presumption in favour of sustainable development set out under Paragraph 11 of the Framework is not currently applicable to this application.

5.9 However, with the publication of the proposed reforms to the Framework on the 30th of July 2024, the accompanying written Ministerial Statement (**Appendix A**) clearly indicates the direction of travel of national policy with the intention of significantly boosting housing supply. When considering the proposed amendments to calculating the Standard Method, Winchester’s unmet housing need is expected to increase by 61%.

- 5.10 The Ministerial Statement should be considered as a relevant material consideration in the determination of this application, and it is highly likely that prior to the determination of this application, the new Framework will be adopted and the tilted balance applied.
- 5.11 In this circumstance, it is clear that there would not be any harm arising from the proposed demolition of the existing buildings and erection of three purpose built, sustainable family homes that would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits. Whilst the application site is situated within the open countryside, due to the thoughtfully considered design in terms of style and materiality, there should be no reason for refusing the proposed development.

FALLBACK POSITION

- 5.12 The proposals seek the demolition of one (Use Class C3) converted barn, caravan and agricultural building (with extant consent for two Use Class C3 dwellings) and the erection of three detached dwellings.
- 5.13 Case law and planning decisions across the country demonstrate that the existence of a real fallback position is an extremely important material consideration that should carry significant weight within the decision-making process. As noted above, two prior approval applications have been granted for the conversion of agricultural buildings on the site under Class Q of the General Permitted Development Order 2015 (as amended). The permission granted in 2016 has been implemented (Application reference: 15/02745/PNCOU), and the permission for the conversion of the agricultural building to two dwellings (Application reference: 24/01837/PNACOU) remains extant meaning this conversion can take place at any time.
- 5.14 It is proposed that the prior approval granted in October 2024 is not implemented, the three buildings positioned on-site are demolished, and three high quality family homes are erected.
- 5.15 When considering Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council's decision to give a fallback position great weight to a planning decision for the replacement of four dwellings approved but not yet converted under permitted development, the Court of Appeal held:

"The council was entitled to accept that there was a real prospect of the fall back development being implemented, and to give the weight it evidently did to that fall back as a material consideration. In doing so, it made no error of law". (Michael Mansell v Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council [2017] EWCA Civ 1314) (Appendix B).

5.16 The Court of Appeal Judgement highlighted three issues surrounding the status of a fallback development as a material consideration in a planning decision:

1. The court must resist a prescriptive approach and must keep in mind the scope for a lawful exercise of planning judgement by a decision-maker;
2. The relevant law as to “*real prospect*” of a fall-back development being implemented. The basic principle is that “... *for a prospect to be a real prospect, it does not have to be probably or likely: a possibility will suffice*”;
3. There is no rule of law, in every case, “*the real prospect*” will depend, for example planning permission having been granted for development, or there being a firm design for the alternative scheme or on the landowner or development having said precisely how he would make use of any permitted development rights available to him under the GPDO.

5.17 The Court of Appeal decision emphasised that the Officer was correct in highlighting that four residential units, albeit of a different form and type to the proposed, could be achieved by way of a fallback development, through the use of permitted development rights. In this instance, two additional residential units on the site can be achieved through the implementation of the fallback consent irrespective of the outcome of this application.

5.18 With regards to this application, it is clear that the applicant intends on developing the site for residential purposes as established through the prior approval process. Since there will not be a net increase in dwellings on the site as a result of the extant permission, the principle of three dwellings in this location has been established, particularly as implementing the extant scheme is a realistic fallback. In terms of the benefits of the proposal when compared with the harm of the fallback position, it is pertinent to consider the sustainability of the development and how the proposals will result in a notable betterment in terms of amenities for future occupiers while generally improving the appearance of the site.

PRECEDENT - 23/01220/FUL

5.19 It must also be noted that an application which sought full planning permission for the *demolition of 2 existing buildings with consents for residential conversion, demolition of 3 other existing buildings and the erection of 2 detached dwellings and 2 semi-detached dwellings* at Land adjacent To Wassalls Hall on Bishops Wood Road (Application reference: 23/01220/FUL) was approved by Winchester City Council in June 2024.

5.20 While Winchester City Council acknowledged that the development plan along with national planning policy seeks to resist residential development within the countryside, it was accepted that a fallback position had been established and that the *“existing prior notification consents were not able to apply policy requirements on sustainability, design, access, open space provision, ecology, landscape impact, etc. (policies DM15-DM18, CP7/DM6, CP16, CP20, DM23) as they were not material considerations”*. The LPA therefore considered that the principle of residential development was acceptable by virtue of the fallback position and that the proposals would offer more *“scope to deliver some significant improvements for the site to be used for residential units”*.




Figure 11 - Relationship between application site and precedent

5.21 The proposed development sought the erection of 2 x three bedroom dwellings and 1 x four bedroom dwelling which was considered an acceptable housing mix while achieving a less contrived living arrangement for the application site. Notwithstanding the technical conflict with Policy DM1 and MTRA4, Winchester City Council confirmed that significant improvements were made when assessed against the fallback position and overall, considered the proposals to be in accordance with the development plan as a whole.

5.22 As considered in the following sections, the development will be wholly in keeping with the character and appearance of the area while enhancing amenities for future occupiers and the biodiversity value of the site. We therefore consider such precedent to be directly comparable to the proposals subject of this application.

5.23 For the above reasons, the principle of development should be considered acceptable, despite the technical conflict with Local Plan Policy DM1 and MTRA4.

5.24 Paragraph 135 of the NPPF states that planning policies and decisions should ensure that developments:

- a) *will function well and add to the overall quality of the area, not just for the short term but over the lifetime of the development;*
- b) *are visually attractive as a result of good architecture, layout and appropriate and effective landscaping;*
- c) *are sympathetic to local character and history, including the surrounding built environment and landscape setting, while not preventing or discouraging appropriate innovation or change (such as increased densities)”.*

5.25 Local Plan Policies CP13, DM15 and DM16 all require that new development is of a high design quality, responding positively to local character and contributing to the distinctiveness of the area.

5.26 As aforementioned, the surrounding area contains a mixture of residential and agricultural sites with traditionally styled dwellings set in generous plots of land. Though the (Use Class C3) converted barn and extant consent have been designed to a good standard under the limitations of Class Q with much of the agricultural character retained, the proposed four bedroom family homes are considered to represent a better planning solution for the site while being wholly-in keeping with the neighbouring dwellings and built form along Bishops Wood Road.



Figure 12 - View of Woodlands looking north east



Figure 13 - View of Woodview looking north west



Figure 14 - View of Flint Cottage and Bishops Oak looking south east

- 5.27 The elevational façade for each dwellinghouse will comprise a specific material palette to be coherent with and retain the relationship with the numerous dwellings located in the immediate setting. The size of the application site is also such that it would ensure that the development is not cramped or contrived and ensures that sufficient landscaping can be provided.
- 5.28 The proposals will certainly improve upon the extant consent and (Use Class C3) converted barn in terms of design and overall appearance of the site, and the planting of native trees will help assimilate the dwellings into the verdant setting. As evidenced on the approved plans, there was an absence of landscaping due to the nature of the prior approval applications. However, in contrast, on-site landscape enhancements have been provided as part of this application which include the planting of native trees and enhancing the boundary hedgerow.
- 5.29 Accordingly, it is considered that the proposals would fit well in the street scene and place no discernible influence on the character and appearance of the area, and overall, fully accord with Winchester City Council’s adopted design policies and Paragraph 135 of the NPPF.

RESIDENTIAL AMENITY

- 5.30 Paragraph 117 of the NPPF states that planning decisions should promote an effective use of land in meeting the need for homes, while safeguarding and improving the environment and ensuring safe and healthy living conditions.
- 5.31 Moreover, decisions should ensure that developments optimise the potential of the site to accommodate and sustain an appropriate amount and mix of development, and create places which promote health and well-being, with a high standard of amenity for existing and future users (Paragraph 135 of the NPPF).
- 5.32 Local Plan Policy DM17 states that: *“New development, alterations and changes of use should be satisfactory in terms of their impact, both on and off site. Development which accords with the Development Plan will be permitted where it:*

...

iv. provides sufficient amenity and recreational space for users;

v. does not have an unacceptable adverse impact on adjoining land, uses or property by reason of overlooking, overshadowing or by being overbearing;

vi. does not cause unacceptable levels of pollution to neighbours by means of noise, smell, dust or other pollution”.

- 5.33 The proposed development offers a better planning solution for the land by providing a high standard of living accommodation and amenity space. In terms of accommodation and future occupant amenity, the family homes will comfortably exceed the Nationally Described Minimum Space Standards. Future occupiers will be able to enjoy high levels of sunlight and daylight, and their usable private garden space and privacy will be improved over and above the existing converted (Use Class C3) barn and extant scheme.
- 5.34 With regard to the impact of the development on neighbouring occupiers, Flint Cottage is the closest neighbour approximately 45 metres north east of the site. This distance ensures that the neighbouring amenities will be preserved. As confirmed in the prior approval applications, the proposed dwellings would also not be subject to detrimental pollution impacts including noise and smell due to the separation from surrounding land uses.
- 5.35 For the above reasons, it is considered that the proposal accords with Paragraph 117 of the NPPF and Local Plan Part 1 Policy DM17.

HIGHWAYS

- 5.36 Paragraph 109 of the NPPF recognises that opportunities to maximise sustainable transport solutions will vary between urban and rural areas. Additionally, Paragraph 115 of the NPPF sets out how development should only be prevented or refused on highway grounds if there would be an unacceptable impact on highway safety, or the residual cumulative impacts on the road network would be **severe**.
- 5.37 For the two applications seeking Class Q prior approval, the Highways Officer raised no objection to the existing access arrangement. The residential use of the site has therefore already been assessed and it is accepted that the access onto Bishops Wood Road provides a satisfactory level of visibility in both directions allowing for safe vehicle access and egress. By virtue of the fact that large vehicle movements will be removed when compared with the former use of the agricultural building positioned on site, the proposals will result in a highway betterment.
- 5.38 The Winchester City Council Residential Parking Standards SPD requires 3 parking spaces be allocated for four-bedroom dwellings. Each dwelling is therefore served by three car parking spaces.

5.39 Though it is acknowledged that this application seeks permission for 3 x four-bedroom family homes, no conditions were attached to the permissions in relation to highway safety. Vehicle trips are expected to be low due to the proposed number of residents on site, and the proposal exceeds the parking standards set by Winchester City Council. Ultimately, the proposal will not result in a severe impact on the local road network.

5.40 As such, the local highway authority has already accepted the principle of residential use on the site and the proposal is considered acceptable on highway grounds.

ECOLOGICAL IMPACT

5.41 Paragraph 180 of the NPPF requires decisions to contribute to and enhance the natural and local environment. Local Plan Part 1 Policy CP16 requires proposals to demonstrate how they protect features of nature conservation and geological value as part of the design rationale. The policy also requires all proposals to incorporate appropriate mitigation measures to avoid and reduce disturbance on sensitive wildlife species and habitats. All development should also seek opportunities to enhance biodiversity.

5.42 The Preliminary Roost Assessment prepared by Phillips Ecology (August 2024) confirmed that the agricultural building supports negligible suitability for roosting bats and found no evidence of bats.

5.43 An Ecological Impact Assessment and biodiversity net gain metric calculation has since been produced by Halpin Robbins (November 2024) in support of the proposed development. The survey area comprised the entire site which includes the agricultural building, caravan and (Use Class C3) converted barn. The report provides mitigation and enhancement measures for the proposed development. Such measures include:

- Retention and protection of hedgerows bounding areas of off-site scrub with fencing during construction works.
- Phased cut methodology in relation to vegetation clearance to minimise any chances of impacting amphibians and reptile including great crested newts.
- Storage of waste sited away from suitable retained or off-site habitat to avoid creating refuges which could be colonised by amphibians.

- Sensitive lighting strategy implemented into the construction and operational phases of the development to avoid, mitigate and compensate for any impacts on foraging/commuting bats.
- Inclusion of one Schwegler N.24 swift brick box on each dwelling.
- Inclusion of one integrated cavity bat box on each dwelling.
- Enhancement of bramble scrub to mixed scrub to increase foraging suitability for hedgehog.
- Planting a mix of native tree.
- 15 metre new native species rich hedgerow planting along the northern, western and southern boundaries of the site.

5.44 To summarise, no direct signs of notable protected species were recorded during the assessment. It has been concluded that while the development has the potential to damage retained hedgerows and trees which form foraging and commuting routes, and an increase in artificial illumination both during the construction and operational phases of the development has the potential to disturb dark flight corridors thereby affecting the ecological functionality of the retained hedgerows and scrub, the noted precautionary avoidance, mitigation and enhancement measures mean that the development can proceed without placing undue harm on protected species.

5.45 As set out at Para 186 d) of the NPPF, opportunities to improve biodiversity in and around developments should be integrated into part of the design and importantly, the proposed development will deliver a **12.34% net gain in habitat units and 190.28% net gain in hedgerow units**. As such, the proposal is in full accordance with CP16 of the Local Plan Part 1 and Section 15 of the NPPF, and this should be considered a significant benefit of the scheme.

PLANNING BALANCE AND CONCLUSIONS

- 6.1 This application seeks planning permission for the demolition of an existing (Use Class C3) converted barn, caravan, agricultural building (with extant consent for residential conversion) and the erection of three detached dwellinghouses with associated hard and soft landscaping.
- 6.2 In accordance with S38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, the policies of the development plan must be the starting point when determining the acceptability of the development proposal. The site currently benefits from prior approval to convert the agricultural building into two dwellings. Whilst the prior approval application and the (Use Class C3) converted barn were designed to a good standard under the limitations of Class Q, the applicant seeks to demolish the buildings positioned on-site and erect three purpose built, sustainable family homes in their replacement.
- 6.3 Notwithstanding the fact that the local planning authority seek to resist new dwellings in the open countryside and there is a technical conflict with the spatial strategy (policies DM1 and MTRA4), it has been made evident that there are material considerations which outweigh the conflict with the development plan. The currently proposed scheme would result in the same outcome with three dwellings on the site, however, it would also result in a demonstrably superior planning outcome with benefits that are not matched by the extant consent and the implemented (Use Class C3) converted barn. As confirmed by the relevant case law, this is a material consideration that should be attributed significant weight and outweighs the in-principle conflict with DM1 and MTRA4.
- 6.4 Further, the proposed family homes have been thoughtfully designed to be wholly in-keeping with the residential properties situated on Bishops Wood Road. By virtue of the traditional style and material palette, the proposals will not place a discernible influence on the character and appearance of the area and will sit seamlessly in the street scene. In terms of future occupant amenity, the family homes will comfortably exceed the Nationally Described Minimum Space Standards, providing spacious and a high standard of living accommodation while not giving rise to any adverse impacts by virtue of loss of sunlight or daylight, unacceptable noise and disturbance on the amenities of neighbouring properties.
- 6.5 The proposed development is accordant with all other relevant development plan policies and would bring about improvements to the appearance of the site, highway safety and result in a notable 12.34% biodiversity net gain in habitat units and 190.28% in hedgerow units. For the above reasons, despite the initial conflict with policies DM1 and MTRA4, the planning balance clearly lies in favour of the proposed development. We therefore commend the proposal to you and respectfully request that Winchester City Council approve this application without delay.

A



Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government

Rt Hon Angela Rayner MP

*Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for
Housing, Communities & Local Government*
2 Marsham Street
London
SW1P 4DF

To: all local authority Leaders in England
Cc: all local authority Chief Executives in
England

30 July 2024

Playing your part in building the homes we need

Earlier today, I set out to the House of Commons the Government's plan to build the homes this country so desperately needs. Our plan is ambitious, it is radical, and I know it will not be without controversy – but as the Prime Minister said on the steps of Downing Street, our work is urgent, and in few areas is that urgency starker than in housing.

As the Leaders and Chief Executives of England's local authorities, you know how dire the situation has become and the depth of the housing crisis in which we find ourselves as a nation. You see it as you place record numbers of homeless children in temporary accommodation; as you grapple with waiting lists for social housing getting longer and longer; and as your younger residents are priced out of home ownership.

It is because of this I know that, like every member of the Government, you will feel not just a professional responsibility but a moral obligation to see more homes built. To take the tough choices necessary to fix the foundations of our housing system. And we will only succeed in this shared mission if we work together – because it falls to you and your authorities not only to plan for the houses we need, but also to deliver the affordable and social housing that can provide working families with a route to a secure home.

To that end, and in a spirit of collaboration and of shared endeavour, I wanted to set out the principal elements of our plan – including what you can expect of the Government, and what we are asking of you.

Universal coverage of local plans

I believe strongly in the plan making system. It is the right way to plan for growth and environmental enhancement, ensuring local leaders and their communities come together to agree the future of their areas. Once in place, and kept up to date, local plans provide the stability and certainty that local people and developers want to see our planning system deliver. In the absence of a plan, development will come forward on a piecemeal basis, with much less public engagement and fewer guarantees that it is the best outcome for your communities.

That is why **our goal has to be for universal coverage of ambitious local plans as quickly as possible**. I would therefore like to draw your attention to the proposed timelines for plan-making set out in Chapter 12 of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) consultation. My objective is to drive all plans to adoption as fast as possible, with the goal of achieving universal plan coverage in this Parliament, while making sure that these plans are sufficiently ambitious.

This will of course mean different things for different authorities.

- For **plans at examination** this means allowing them to continue, although where there is a significant gap between the plan and the new local housing need figure, we will expect authorities to begin a plan immediately in the new system.
- For **plans at an advanced stage of preparation** (Regulation 19), it means allowing them to continue to examination unless there is a significant gap between the plan and the new local housing need figure, in which case we propose to ask authorities to rework their plans to take account of the higher figure.
- **Areas at an earlier stage of plan development**, should prepare plans against the revised version of the National Planning Policy Framework and progress as quickly as possible.

I understand that will delay the adoption of some plans, but I want to balance keeping plans flowing to adoption with making sure they plan for sufficient housing. I also know that going back and increasing housing numbers will create additional work, which is why we will provide financial support to those authorities asked to do this. The Government is committed to taking action to ensure authorities have up-to-date local plans in place, supporting local democratic engagement with how, not if, necessary development should happen. On that basis, and while I hope the need will not arise, I will not hesitate to use my powers of intervention should it be necessary to drive progress – including taking over an authority's plan making directly. The consultation we have published today sets out corresponding proposals to amend the local plan intervention criteria.

We will also empower Inspectors to be able to take the tough decisions they need to at examination, by being clear that they should not be devoting significant time and energy during an examination to 'fix' a deficient plan – in turn allowing Inspectors to focus on those plans that are capable of being found sound and can be adopted quickly.

Strategic planning

We know however that whilst planning at the local authority level is critical, it's not enough to deliver the growth we want to see. That is why the Government was clear in the Manifesto that housing need in England cannot be met without planning for growth on a larger than local scale, and that it will be necessary to introduce effective new mechanisms for cross-boundary strategic planning.

This will play a vital role in delivering sustainable growth and addressing key spatial issues – including meeting housing needs, delivering strategic infrastructure, building the economy, and

improving climate resilience. Strategic planning will also be important in planning for local growth and Local Nature Recovery Strategies.

We will therefore take the steps necessary to enable universal coverage of strategic planning within this Parliament, which we will formalise in legislation. This model will support elected Mayors in overseeing the development and agreement of Spatial Development Strategies (SDSs) for their areas. The Government will also explore the most effective arrangements for developing SDSs outside of mayoral areas, in order that we can achieve universal coverage in England, recognising that we will need to consider both the appropriate geographies to use to cover functional economic areas, and the right democratic mechanisms for securing agreement.

Across all areas, these arrangements will encourage partnership working but we are determined to ensure that, whatever the circumstances, SDSs can be concluded and adopted. The Government will work with local leaders and the wider sector to consult on, develop and test these arrangements in the months ahead before legislation is introduced, including consideration of the capacity and capabilities needed such as geospatial data and digital tools.

While this is the right approach in the medium-term, we do not want to wait where there are opportunities to make progress now. We are therefore also taking three immediate steps.

- First, in addition to the continued operation of the duty to cooperate in the current system, we are strengthening the position in the NPPF on cooperation between authorities, in order to ensure that the right engagement is occurring on the sharing of unmet housing need and other strategic issues where plans are being progressed in the short-term.
- Second, we will work in concert with Mayoral Combined Authorities to explore extending existing powers to develop an SDS.
- Third, we intend to identify priority groupings of other authorities where strategic planning – and in particular the sharing of housing need – would provide particular benefits, and engage directly with the authorities concerned to structure and support this cooperation, using powers of intervention as and where necessary.

Housing targets

Underpinning plan making – at the strategic and local level – must be suitably ambitious housing targets. That is why we have confirmed today that we intend to **restore the standard method as the required approach for assessing housing needs and planning for homes**, and reverse the wider changes made to the NPPF in December 2023 that were detrimental to housing supply.

But simply going back to the previous position is not enough, because it failed to deliver enough homes. So, we are also consulting on **a new standard method** to ensure local plans are ambitious enough to support the Government's commitment to build 1.5 million new homes over the next five years. The new method sees a distribution that will drive growth in every corner of the country. This includes a stretching yet credible target for London, with what was previously unmet need in the capital effectively reallocated to see homes built in areas where they will be delivered. The new

method increases targets across all other regions relative to the existing one, and significantly boosts expectations across our city regions – with targets in Mayoral Combined Authority areas on average growing by more than 30%.

I want to be clear that local authorities will be **expected to make every effort to allocate land in line with their housing need as per the standard method**, noting it is possible to justify a lower housing requirement than the figure the method sets on the basis of local constraints on land and delivery, such as flood risk. Any such justification will need to be evidenced and explained through consultation and examination, and local authorities that cannot meet their development needs will have to demonstrate how they have worked with other nearby authorities to share that unmet need.

And we are also committed to making sure that **the right kind of homes are delivered through our planning system as quickly as possible**. That is why we are proposing to remove the prescriptive approach to affordable home ownership products, which can squeeze out Social and Affordable rent homes despite acute need. This will free authorities to secure more Social Rent homes, ensuring you get the homes you need in your local areas. We also want to promote the delivery of mixed use sites which can include a variety of ownership and rental tenures, including rented affordable housing and build to rent, and which provide a range of benefits – including creating diverse communities and supporting timely build out rates.

Green Belt and Grey Belt

If targets tell us what needs to be built, the next step is to make sure we are building in the right places. The first port of call is rightly brownfield land, and we have proposed some changes today to support such development.

But brownfield land can only be part of the answer, which is why we are consulting on changes that would see councils **required to review boundaries and release Green Belt land where necessary to meet unmet housing or commercial need**.

I want to be clear that this Government is committed to protecting nature. That is why land safeguarded for environmental reasons will maintain its existing protections. But we know that large parts of the Green Belt have little ecological value and are inaccessible to the public, and that the development that happens under the existing framework can be haphazard – too often lacking the affordable homes and wider infrastructure that communities need. Meanwhile, low quality parts of the Green Belt, which we have termed ‘grey belt’ and which make little contribution to Green Belt purposes, like disused car parks and industrial estates, remain undeveloped.

We will therefore ask authorities to prioritise sustainable development on previously developed land and other low quality ‘grey belt’ sites, before looking to other sustainable locations for meeting this need. We want decisions on where to release land to remain locally led, as we believe that local authorities are in the best position to judge what land within current Green Belt boundaries will be most suitable for development. But we also want to ensure enough land is identified in the planning system to meet housing and commercial need, and so we have proposed a clear route to bringing forward schemes on ‘grey belt’ land outside the plan process where delivery falls short of need.

To make sure development on the Green Belt truly benefits your communities, we are also **establishing firm golden rules**, with a target of at least 50% of the homes onsite being affordable, and a requirement that all developments are supported by the infrastructure needed – including GP surgeries, schools and transport links - as well as greater provision of accessible green space.

Growth supporting infrastructure

Building more homes is fundamental to unlocking economic growth, but we need to do so much more. That is why we are also proposing changes to make it **easier to build growth-supporting infrastructure** such as laboratories, gigafactories, data centres, electricity grid connections and the networks that support freight and logistics – and seeking views on whether we should include some of these types of projects in the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects regime.

Having ended the ban on onshore wind on our fourth day in office, we are also proposing to: boost the weight that planning policy gives to the benefits associated with **renewables**; bring larger scale onshore wind projects back into the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects regime; and change the threshold for solar development to reflect developments in solar technology. In addition, we are testing whether to bring a broader definition of water infrastructure into the scope of the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects regime.

And recognising the role that planning plays in the **broader needs of communities**, we are proposing a number of changes to: support new, expanded or upgraded public service infrastructure; take a vision-led approach to transport planning, challenging the now outdated default assumption of automatic traffic growth; promote healthy communities, in particular tackling the scourge of childhood obesity; and boost the provision of much needed facilities for early-years childcare and post-16 education.

Capacity and fees

I recognise that delivering on the above ambition will demand much from you and your teams, and your capacity is strained. We want to **see planning services put on a more sustainable footing**, which is why we are consulting on whether to use the Planning and Infrastructure Bill to allow local authorities to set their own fees, better reflecting local costs and reducing financial pressures on local authority budgets.

While legislative change is important, we also do not want to wait to get extra resource into planning departments – which is why I am consulting on increasing planning fees for householder applications and other applications, that for too long have been well below cost recovery. We know that we are asking a lot more of local authorities, and we are clear that this will only be possible if we find a way to give more resource.

It is also important that you are supported in the critical role you play when the infrastructure needed to kickstart economic growth and make Britain a clean energy superpower is being consented under the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects regime. I am therefore consulting on whether to

make provision to allow host upper and lower tier (or unitary) authorities to recover costs for relevant services provided in relation to applications, and proposed applications, for development consent.

Social and affordable housing

Overhauling our planning system is key to delivering the 1.5 million homes we have committed to build over the next five years – but it is not enough. We need to diversify supply, and I want to make sure that you have the tools and support needed to deliver quality affordable and social housing, reversing the continued decline in stock. This is vital to help you manage local pressures, including tackling and preventing homelessness.

Within the current Affordable Homes Programme (AHP), we know that particularly outside London, almost all of the funding for the 2021-2026 AHP is contractually committed. That is why I have confirmed that we will **press Homes England and the Greater London Authority (GLA) to maximise the number of Social Rent homes in allocating the remaining funding.**

The Government will also bring forward details of future Government investment in social and affordable housing at the Spending Review, so that social housing providers can plan for the future and help deliver **the biggest increase in affordable housebuilding in a generation.** We will work with Mayors and local areas to consider how funding can be used in their areas and support devolution and local growth.

In addition, I have confirmed that the Local Authority Housing Fund (LAHF) 3 will be going ahead, with £450 million provided to councils to acquire and create homes for families at risk of homelessness. This will create over 2,000 affordable homes for some of the most vulnerable families in society.

I recognise that councils and housing associations need support to build their capacity if they are to make a greater contribution to affordable housing supply. We will set out plans at the next fiscal event to **give councils and housing associations the rent stability they need** to be able to borrow and invest in both new and existing homes, while also ensuring that there are appropriate protections for both existing and future social housing tenants.

As we work to build more affordable homes, we also need to do better at maintaining our existing stock – which is why I have announced three updates on the Right to Buy scheme:

- First, we have started to review the increased Right to Buy discounts introduced in 2012, and we will bring forward secondary legislation to implement changes in the autumn;
- Second, we will review Right to Buy more widely, including looking at eligibility criteria and protections for new homes, bringing forward a consultation also in the autumn; and
- Third, we are increasing the flexibilities that apply to how councils can use their Right to Buy receipts.

With respect to the third point, from today we are removing the caps on the percentage of replacements delivered as acquisitions (which was previously 50%) and the percentage cost of a replacement home that can be funded using Right to Buy receipts (which was also previously 50%).

Councils will also now be able to combine Right to Buy receipts with section 106 contributions. These flexibilities will be in place for an initial 24 months, subject to review. My department will be writing to stock-holding local authorities with more details on the changes, and I would encourage you to make the best use of these flexibilities to maximise Right to Buy replacements and to achieve the right balance between acquisitions and new builds.

Finally, I would like to emphasise the importance of homes being decent, safe and warm. That is why this Government will introduce Awaab's Law into the social rented sector. We will set out more detail and bring forward the secondary legislation to implement this in due course. We also intend to bring forward more detail in the autumn on our plans to raise standards and strengthen residents' voices.

Next phase of reform

The action we have announced today will get us building, but as I said to the House of Commons it represents only a downpayment on our ambitions.

As announced in the King's Speech, we will introduce a Planning and Infrastructure Bill later in the first session, which will: modernise planning committees by introducing a national scheme of delegation that focuses their efforts on the applications that really matter, and places more trust in skilled professional planners to do the rest; enable local authorities to put their planning departments on a sustainable footing; further reform compulsory purchase compensation rules to ensure that what is paid to landowners is fair but not excessive; streamline the delivery process for critical infrastructure; and provide any necessary legal underpinning to ensure we can use development to fund nature recovery where currently both are stalled.


We will consult on the right approach to strategic planning, in particular how we structure arrangements outside of Mayoral Combined Authorities, considering both the right geographies and democratic mechanisms.

We will say more imminently about how we intend to deliver on our commitment to build a new generation of new towns. This will include large-scale new communities built on greenfield land and separated from other nearby settlements, but also a larger number of urban extensions and urban regeneration schemes that will work with the grain of development in any given area.

And because we know that the housing crisis cannot be fixed overnight, the Government will publish a long-term housing strategy, alongside the Spending Review, which the Chancellor announced yesterday.

We have a long way to go, but I hope today proves to be a major first step for all of us as we seek to put the housing crisis behind us. I look forward to working with you all, and am confident that together, we can achieve significant improvements that will benefit our citizens.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink on a light grey background. The signature is written in a cursive style and reads "A Rayner". The first letter 'A' is large and loops around the start of the name. The 'y' has a long tail that loops under the 'n'.

RT HON ANGELA RAYNER MP

Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Housing, Communities & Local Government

B



Neutral Citation Number: [2017] EWCA Civ 1314

Case No: C1/2016/4488

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
PLANNING COURT
MR JUSTICE GARNHAM
[2016] EWHC 2832 (Admin)

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 8 September 2017

Before:

The Chancellor of the High Court
Lord Justice Lindblom
and
Lord Justice Hickinbottom

Between:

Michael Mansell

Appellant

- and -

Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council

Respondent

- and -

(1) Croudace Portland

Interested

(2) The East Malling Trust

Parties

Ms Annabel Graham Paul (instructed by **Richard Buxton Environmental and Public Law**)
for the **Appellant**

Mr Juan Lopez (instructed by **Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council Legal Services**)
for the **Respondent**

The interested parties did not appear and were not represented

Hearing date: 4 July 2017

**Judgment Approved by the court
for handing down
(subject to editorial corrections)**

Lord Justice Lindblom:

Introduction

1. Should the judge in the court below have quashed a local planning authority’s grant of planning permission for the redevelopment of the site of a large barn and a bungalow to provide four dwellings? That is what we must decide in this appeal. It is contended that the authority misdirected itself in considering a “fallback position” available to the landowner, and also that it misapplied the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” in the National Planning Policy Framework (“the NPPF”) – a question that can now be dealt with in the light of this court’s recent decision in *Barwood Strategic Land II LLP v East Staffordshire Borough Council* [2017] EWCA Civ 893.
2. The appellant, Mr Michael Mansell, appeals against the order of Garnham J., dated 10 November 2016, dismissing his claim for judicial review of the planning permission granted on 13 January 2016 by the respondent, Tonbridge and Malling Borough Council, for development proposed by the first interested party, Croudace Portland, on land owned by the second interested party, the East Malling Trust, at Rocks Farm, The Rocks Road, East Malling. The proposal was to demolish the barn and the bungalow on the land and to construct four detached dwellings, with garages and gardens. Mr Mansell lives in a neighbouring property, at 132-136 The Rocks Road – a grade II listed building. He was an objector.
3. It was common ground that the proposal was in conflict with the development plan. Rocks Farm is outside the village of East Malling to its south-east, within the “countryside” as designated in the Tonbridge and Malling Borough Core Strategy. The site of the proposed development extends to about 1.3 hectares. The barn, about 600 square metres in area, had once been used to store apples. The bungalow was lived in by a caretaker. The application for planning permission came before the council’s Area 3 Planning Committee on 7 January 2016. In his reports to committee the council’s planning officer recommended that planning permission be granted, and that recommendation was accepted by the committee. The officer guided the members on the “fallback position” that was said to arise, at least partly, through the “permitted development” rights for changes of use from the use of a building as an agricultural building to its use as a dwelling-house, under Class Q in Part 3 of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (“the GPDO”).
4. Mr Mansell’s challenge to the planning permission attacked the officer’s approach to the “fallback position” and his assessment of the proposal on its planning merits. Garnham J. dismissed the claim for judicial review on all grounds. Permission to appeal was granted by McCombe L.J. on 21 February 2017.

The issues in the appeal

5. The appeal raises three main issues:
 - (1) whether the council correctly interpreted and lawfully applied the provisions of Class Q in the GPDO (ground 1 in the appellant’s notice);

- (2) whether the council was entitled to accept there was a real prospect of the fallback development being implemented (ground 2); and
- (3) whether the council misunderstood or misapplied the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” (ground 3).

Did the council correctly interpret and lawfully apply the provisions of Class Q?

6. When the council determined the application for planning permission the permitted development rights under Class Q were in these terms, so far is relevant here:

“Q. Permitted development

Development consisting of –

- (a) a change of use of a building and any land within its curtilage from a use as an agricultural building to a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses) of the Schedule to the Use Classes Order; and
- (b) building operations reasonably necessary to convert the building referred to in paragraph (a) to a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses) of that Schedule.

Q.1 Development not permitted

Development is not permitted by Class Q if –

- ...
- (b) the cumulative floor space of the existing building or buildings changing use under Class Q within an established agricultural unit exceeds 450 square metres;
 - (c) the cumulative number of separate dwellinghouses developed under Class Q within an established agricultural unit exceeds 3;
- ...
- (g) the development would result in the external dimensions of the building extending beyond the external dimensions of the existing building at any given point;
 - (h) the development under Class Q (together with any previous development under Class Q) would result in a building or buildings having more than 450 square metres of floor space having a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses) of the Schedule to the Use Classes Order;
- ...”

The permitted development rights under Class Q are subject to several “Conditions” in paragraph Q.2, none of them controversial here.

7. In section 6 of his main report to committee for its meeting on 7 January 2016 the officer dealt at length with the “Determining Issues”. In discussing those issues he considered the “fallback position” in paragraphs 6.14 to 6.19:

“6.14 In practical terms for this site, the new permitted development rights mean that the existing agricultural barn could be converted into three residential units. Some representations point out that only a proportion of the barn could be

converted in such a manner (up to 450sqm) but the remainder – a small proportion in terms of the overall footprint – could conceivably be left unconverted and the resultant impacts for the site in terms of the amount of residential activity would be essentially the same. The building could be physically adapted in certain ways that would allow for partial residential occupation and the extensive area of hardstanding which exists between the building and the northern boundary could be used for parking and turning facilities.

6.15 The existing bungalow within the site could be replaced in accordance with policy CP14 with a new residential building provided that it was not materially larger than the existing building. Such a scenario would, in effect, give rise to the site being occupied by a total of four residential units albeit of a different form and type to that proposed by this application. This provides a realistic fallback position in terms of how the site could be developed.

6.16 I appreciate that discussion concerning realistic ‘fallback’ positions is rather complicated but, in making an assessment of any application for development, we are bound to consider what the alternatives might be for a site: in terms of what could occur on the site without requiring any permission at all (historic use rights) or using permitted development rights for alternative forms of development.

6.17 In this instance a scheme confined to taking advantage of permitted development would, in my view, be to the detriment of the site as a whole in visual terms. Specifically, it would have to be developed in a contrived and piecemeal fashion in order to conform to the requirements of the permitted development rights, including the need to adhere to the restrictions on the floor space that can be converted using the permitted development rights.

6.18 I would also mention that should the applicant wish to convert the entire barn for residential purposes, above the permitted development thresholds, such a scheme (subject to detailed design) would wholly accord with adopted policy. Again, this provides a strong indicator as to how the site could be developed in an alternative way that would still retain the same degree of residential activity as proposed by the current application but in a more contrived manner and with a far more direct physical relationship with the nearest residential properties.

6.19 The current proposal therefore, in my view, offers an opportunity for a more comprehensive and coherent redevelopment of the site as opposed to a more piecemeal form of development that would arise should the applicant seek to undertake to implement permitted development rights.”

8. For Mr Mansell, Ms Annabel Graham Paul submitted to us, as she did to the judge, that the officer’s advice in those six paragraphs betrays a misunderstanding of the provisions of Class Q in the GPDO, in particular sub-paragraphs Q.1(b) and Q.1(h). She argued that the restriction to 450 square metres in sub-paragraph Q.1(b) applies to the total floor space of the agricultural building or buildings in question, not to the floor space actually “changing use”. Before the judge, though not in her submissions in this court, Ms Graham Paul sought to bolster that contention with a passage in an inspector’s decision letter

relating to a proposal for development on a site referred to by the judge as “Mannings Farm”. The inspector had observed that “[the] floor space of the existing building ... far exceeds the maximum permitted threshold, of 450 sq m, as set out in [sub-paragraph] Q.1(b)”, and that “the intention is to reduce the size of the building as part of the proposal but Q.1(b) clearly relates to existing floorspace and there is no provision in the GPDO for this to be assessed on any other basis”.

9. Garnham J. rejected Ms Graham Paul’s argument. In paragraph 30 of his judgment he said:

“30. In my judgment this construction of paragraph Q.1(b) fails because it disregards the definition section of the Order. The critical expression in subparagraph (b) is *“the existing building or buildings”*. Paragraph 2 of the Order defines *“building”* as *“any part of a building”*. Accordingly, the paragraph should be read as meaning *“the cumulative floor space of the existing building or any part of the building changing use ...”*. If that is right, it is self-evident that the limit on floor space relates only to that part of the building which is changing use.”

10. The judge found support for that conclusion in several inspectors’ decisions, one of them a decision on proposed development at Bennetts Lane, Binegar in Somerset. In correspondence in that case the Department for Communities and Local Government had pointed to the definition of a “building” in the “Interpretation” provisions in paragraph 2 of the GPDO. Because that definition included “any part of a building”, their view was that “in the case of a large agricultural building, part of it could change use ... and the rest remain in agricultural use” (paragraph 32 of the judgment). However, as was accepted on both sides in this appeal, the court must construe the provisions of the GPDO for itself, applying familiar principles of statutory interpretation.

11. In paragraph 34 of his judgment Garnham J. said this:

“34. Ms Graham Paul contends that that construction of subparagraph (b) means that it adds nothing to subparagraph (h). I can see the force of that submission and, as a matter of first principle, statutory provisions should be construed on the assumption that the draftsman was intending to add something substantive by each relevant provision. Nonetheless, giving the interpretation section its proper weight, I see no alternative to the conclusion that Class Q imposes a floor space limit on those parts of the buildings which will change use as a result of the development. In those circumstances, I reject the Claimant's challenge to the Officer's construction of the Class Q provisions in the 2015 Order.”

12. Ms Graham Paul submitted that this interpretation of the relevant provisions would render sub-paragraph Q.1(b) of Class Q redundant, because sub-paragraph Q.1(h) already limits the residential floor space resulting from the change of use under Class Q to a maximum of 450 square metres. The statutory provisions for permitted development rights in the GPDO ought to be interpreted consistently. The interpretation favoured by the judge, submitted Ms Graham Paul, depends on reading into sub-paragraph Q.1(b) the additional words “any part of a building” after the words “the existing building or buildings”, which, she said, is wholly unnecessary. Statutory provisions ought to be construed on the

assumption that the draftsman was intending to add something of substance in each provision. The judge's interpretation offends that principle, said Ms Graham Paul, because it would, in effect, subsume sub-paragraph Q.1(b) into sub-paragraph Q.1(h). Only her interpretation of sub-paragraph Q.1(b) would enable sub-paragraph Q.1(h) to add something of substance to the provisions of Class Q. And in principle, Ms Graham Paul argued, it makes good sense to prevent, without an express grant of planning permission, the partial conversion of large agricultural buildings to accommodate residential use, leaving other parts of the building either in active agricultural use or simply vacant.

13. Ms Graham Paul sought to reinforce these submissions by pointing to other provisions of the GPDO where similar wording is used: Class M, which provides permitted development rights for changes of use of buildings in retail or betting office or pay day loan shop use to Class C3 use, and states in sub-paragraph M.1(c) that development is not permitted if “the cumulative floor space of the existing building changing use under Class M exceeds 150 square metres”; and Class N, which provides permitted development rights for changes of use from specified sui generis uses, including use as an amusement arcade or centre, and use as a casino, to Class C3 use, and states in sub-paragraph N.1(b) that development is not permitted if “the cumulative floor space of the existing building changing use under Class N exceeds 150 square metres”.
14. I cannot accept Ms Graham Paul's argument. I think the judge's understanding of Class Q was correct. The provisions of Class Q relating to the scope of permitted development rights should be given their literal meaning. When this is done, they make perfectly good sense in their statutory context and do not give rise to any duplication or redundancy.
15. The focus here is on the provisions as to development that is “not permitted” under paragraph Q.1, and in particular the provisions of sub-paragraphs Q.1(b) and Q.1(h). Sub-paragraph Q.1(b) establishes the “cumulative floor space of the existing building or buildings” that is “changing use under Class Q ...”. The limit on such “cumulative floor space ...” is 450 square metres. This restriction is stated to be a restriction on the change of use, not on the size of the building or buildings in which the change of use occurs. Sub-paragraph Q.1(b) relates to a single act of development in which the building in question, or part of it, is “changing use”. The floor space limit set by it relates not to the total floor space of the building or buildings concerned. It relates, as one would expect, to the permitted development rights themselves, which apply to the “cumulative” amount of floor space actually “changing use under Class Q”. The use of the word “cumulative” in this context – as elsewhere in the GPDO – is perfectly clear. It connotes, in relevant circumstances, the adding together of separate elements of floor space within a building or buildings, or, again in relevant circumstances, a single element of floor space, which in either case must not exceed 450 square metres. The total floor space of the building or buildings concerned may itself be more than 450 square metres. But the cumulative amount of floor space whose use is permitted to be changed within that total floor space must not exceed 450 square metres.
16. This interpretation of sub-paragraph Q.1(b) avoids arbitrary consequences in the application of the permitted development rights under Class Q. It does not make the availability of those rights for a qualifying “agricultural building” depend on the total floor space of the building itself. It would not, therefore, create a situation in which the permitted development rights under Class Q would be available for a building whose total floor space was 450 square metres, but not for a building with a floor space of 451 square

metres or an area greater than that. If the consequence is that the permitted development rights, when fully used, would result in a building partly in use as a dwelling-house and partly still in agricultural use, that is an outcome contemplated by the GPDO. I see no difficulty in that.

17. Had the draftsman intended to confer permitted development rights under Class Q only to a building or buildings whose total floor space was not more than 450 square metres, the relevant provision would have been framed differently. There would have been no need to use the word “cumulative” or some other such word. The provision would simply have stated, for example, “the total floor space of the existing building or buildings within an established agricultural unit in which the change of use under Class Q is being undertaken does not exceed 450 square metres”. But that is not what sub-paragraph Q.1(b) says, or, in my view, what it means.
18. Nor can I see how an interpretation of sub-paragraph Q.1(b) in which the restriction of 450 square metres applies not to the floor space actually changing use but to the total floor space of the building or buildings in which the change of use is taking place can be reconciled with the definition of “building” in paragraph 2 of the GPDO as including “part of a building”. Unless one disapplies that part of the definition of a building to sub-paragraph Q.1(b), one must read that provision as meaning “the cumulative floor space of the existing building or buildings or part of a building changing use under Class Q ... exceeds 450 square metres” (my emphasis). That understanding of sub-paragraph Q.1(b) would not sit happily with the concept that the restriction of 450 square metres applies not to the floor space changing use but to the total floor space of the building itself.
19. My interpretation of sub-paragraph Q.1(b) does not leave sub-paragraph Q.1(h) redundant. Sub-paragraph Q.1(h) achieves a different purpose. It prevents, for example, a change of use as “permitted development” in an agricultural building of which part is already in Class C3 use, or an aggregation of successive changes of use through separate acts of development, that would result in more than 450 square metres of floor space in a building or buildings being in Class C3 use. Neither of those outcomes would necessarily be prevented by sub-paragraph Q.1(b).
20. Finally, there is nothing in the provisions of Class M and Class N, or in any other provision of the GPDO, to suggest a different understanding of Class Q. The provisions in sub-paragraphs M.1(c) and N.1(b) also contain the word “cumulative” in referring to the floor space “changing use”, not to the total floor space of the “existing building or buildings” in which the change of use is taking place. And in both Class M and Class N the draftsman has also included a provision – respectively in sub-paragraphs M.1(d) and N.1(c) – stating that “the development (together with any previous development under [the relevant class]) would result in more than 150 square metres of floor space in the building having changed use under [the relevant class]”. Although we are not deciding those questions, it seems to me that the same analysis would hold good for those provisions too.
21. In my view, therefore, the officer did not misrepresent the permitted development rights under Class Q in his advice to the committee on the “fallback position”. The provisions of Class Q were correctly interpreted and lawfully applied.

Was the council entitled to accept that there was a real prospect of the fallback development being implemented?

22. Garnham J. accepted that the council was entitled to conclude that there was a “realistic” fallback. In paragraphs 36 and 37 of his judgment he said:

“36. In paragraph 6.15 of the report the Officer concluded that the fall back position was “realistic”. In my judgment he was entitled so to conclude. The evidence establishes that there had been prior discussions between the Council and the Planning Agent acting for the East Malling Trust who owns the site. It was crystal clear from that contact that the Trust were intending, one way or another to develop the site. Alternative proposals had been advanced seeking the Council’s likely reaction to planning applications. It is in my view wholly unrealistic to imagine that were all such proposals to be turned down the owner of the site would not take advantage of the permitted development provided for by Class Q to the fullest extent possible.

37. It was not a precondition to the Council’s consideration of the fall back option that the interested party had made an application indicating an intention to take advantage of Class Q. There was no requirement that there be a formulated proposal to that effect. The officer was entitled to have regard to the planning history which was within his knowledge and the obvious preference of the Trust to make the most valuable use it could of the site.”

23. The judge accepted the submission of Mr Juan Lopez for the council that the committee did not have to ignore fallback development that included elements for which planning permission would be required and had not yet been granted. He noted that “[the] building could be converted, so as to provide dwelling houses limited in floor space to 450m² by the construction of internal walls without using the whole of the internal space of the barn” (paragraph 40). And he went on to say (in paragraph 41):

“41. In my judgment therefore, it would have been unrealistic to have concluded that, were the present application for permission to be rejected, the interested party would do nothing to develop this site. On the contrary it was plain that development was contemplated and that some development could have taken place pursuant to Class Q. The Council was entitled to have regard to the fact that there might be separate applications for permission in respect of some elements of the scheme and to advise that appropriate regard must be had to material planning considerations including the permitted development fall back position. Accordingly I reject the second element of the Claimant's challenge on ground 1.”

24. Ms Graham Paul criticized the judge’s approach. She said it would enable permitted development rights under the GPDO to be relied on as a fallback even where there was no evidence that the landowner or developer would in fact resort to such development. The judge did not consider whether the council had satisfied itself that there was a “real prospect” of the fallback development being implemented (see the judgment of Sullivan L.J. in *Samuel Smith Old Brewery (Tadcaster) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government* [2009] J.P.L. 1326, at paragraph 21). The “real prospect”, submitted Ms Graham Paul, must relate to a particular fallback development contemplated by the

landowner or developer, not merely some general concept of development that might be possible on the site. Only a specific fallback makes it possible for a comparison to be made between the planning merits of the development proposed and the fallback development. The relevance of a fallback depends on there being a “finding of actually intended use as opposed to a mere legal or theoretical entitlement” (see the judgment of Mr Christopher Lockhart-Mummery Q.C., sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court, in *R. v Secretary of State for the Environment and Havering London Borough Council, ex parte P.F. Ahern (London) Ltd.* [1998] Env. L.R. 189, at p.196).

25. Ms Graham Paul said there was nothing before the council to show that either the East Malling Trust or Croudace Portland contemplated the site being developed in the way the officer described in his report. On the contrary, the conversion of the barn for residential use – as opposed to its demolition and replacement with new dwellings – seems to have been regarded as impracticable or uneconomic. The East Malling Trust’s planning consultant, Broadlands Planning Ltd., had submitted a “Planning Statement” to the council in December 2013, seeking the council’s advice before the submission of an application for planning permission. In that document two possible schemes for the site were referred to (at paragraph 26). Neither could have been achieved using permitted development rights. One involved the retention of the barn and its conversion to four dwelling-houses, the other a “wholesale redevelopment of the site”, perhaps with the replacement of the bungalow, to create five new dwellings. In a letter to Broadlands Planning Ltd. dated 30 January 2014 the council’s Senior Planning Officer, Ms Holland, said she was “not convinced that the proposal would result in the building being converted, but rather [that] large portions would be removed and a new building created”. And the East Malling Trust’s marketing agent, Smiths Gore, in a letter to potential developers dated 27 February 2014, suggested it was “unlikely that a developer would contemplate the conversion of the Apple Store”. There was, said Ms Graham Paul, no other contemporaneous evidence to lend substance to the fallback scheme to which the officer referred in his report, and no evidence of the council trying to find out what, if anything, was actually contemplated. The evidence did not demonstrate a “real prospect” – as opposed to a merely “theoretical” prospect – of such a development being carried out. The judge should have recognized that the fallback development referred to in the officer’s report was not a material consideration.
26. I cannot accept that argument. In my view the officer did not misunderstand any principle of law relating to a fallback development. His advice to the members was sound.
27. The status of a fallback development as a material consideration in a planning decision is not a novel concept. It is very familiar. Three things can be said about it:
 - (1) Here, as in other aspects of the law of planning, the court must resist a prescriptive or formulaic approach, and must keep in mind the scope for a lawful exercise of planning judgment by a decision-maker.
 - (2) The relevant law as to a “real prospect” of a fallback development being implemented was applied by this court in *Samuel Smith Old Brewery* (see, in particular, paragraphs 17 to 30 of Sullivan L.J.’s judgment, with which the Master of the Rolls and Toulson L.J. agreed; and the judgment of Supperstone J. in *R. (on the application of Kverndal) v London Borough of Hounslow Council* [2015] EWHC 3084 (Admin), at paragraphs 17 and 42 to 53). As

Sullivan L.J. said in his judgment in *Samuel Smith Old Brewery*, in this context a “real” prospect is the antithesis of one that is “merely theoretical” (paragraph 20). The basic principle is that “... for a prospect to be a real prospect, it does not have to be probable or likely: a possibility will suffice” (paragraph 21). Previous decisions at first instance, including *Ahern* and *Brentwood Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment* [1996] 72 P. & C.R. 61 must be read with care in the light of that statement of the law, and bearing in mind, as Sullivan L.J. emphasized, “... “fall back” cases tend to be very fact-specific” (*ibid.*). The role of planning judgment is vital. And “[it] is important ... not to constrain what is, or should be, in each case the exercise of a broad planning discretion, based on the individual circumstances of that case, by seeking to constrain appeal decisions within judicial formulations that are not enactments of general application but are themselves simply the judge’s response to the facts of the case before the court” (paragraph 22).

- (3) Therefore, when the court is considering whether a decision-maker has properly identified a “real prospect” of a fallback development being carried out should planning permission for the proposed development be refused, there is no rule of law that, in every case, the “real prospect” will depend, for example, on the site having been allocated for the alternative development in the development plan or planning permission having been granted for that development, or on there being a firm design for the alternative scheme, or on the landowner or developer having said precisely how he would make use of any permitted development rights available to him under the GPDO. In some cases that degree of clarity and commitment may be necessary; in others, not. This will always be a matter for the decision-maker’s planning judgment in the particular circumstances of the case in hand.

28. In this case, in the circumstances as they were when the application for planning permission went before the committee, it was plainly appropriate, indeed necessary, for the members to take into account the fallback available to the East Malling Trust as the owner of the land, including the permitted development rights arising under Class Q in the GPDO and the relevant provisions of the development plan, in particular policy CP14 of the core strategy. Not to have done so would have been a failure to have regard to a material consideration, and thus an error of law.
29. That the East Malling Trust was intent upon achieving the greatest possible value from the redevelopment of the site for housing had by then been made quite plain. The “Planning Statement” of December 2013 had referred to two alternative proposals for the redevelopment of the site (paragraph 26), pointing out that both “[the] redevelopment and replacement of [the] bungalow” and “[the] conversion of the existing storage and packing shed” were “permissible in principle” (paragraph 35). The firm intention of the East Malling Trust to go ahead with a residential development was entirely clear at that stage.
30. In my view it was, in the circumstances, entirely reasonable to assume that any relevant permitted development rights by which the East Malling Trust could achieve residential development value from the site would ultimately be relied upon if an application for planning permission for the construction of new dwellings were refused. That was a simple and obvious reality – whether explicitly stated by the East Malling Trust or not. It was accurately and quite properly reflected in the officer’s report to committee. It is

reinforced by evidence before the court – in the witness statement of Mr Humphrey, the council’s Director of Planning, Housing and Environmental Health, dated 18 March 2016 (in paragraphs 6 to 24), in the witness statement of Mr Wilkinson, the Land and Sales Manager of Croudace Portland, also dated 18 March 2016 (in paragraphs 4 to 7), in the first witness statement of Ms Flanagan, the Property and Commercial Director of the East Malling Trust, dated 17 March 2016 (in paragraphs 4 to 6), and in Ms Flanagan’s second witness statement, dated 17 June 2016 (in paragraphs 2 to 5).

31. As Ms Flanagan says (in paragraph 2 of her second witness statement):

“2. At paragraph 6 of my first witness statement, I state that there was no doubt that the Trust would consider alternatives to the preferred scheme. To further amplify, the Trust (as a charitable body) is tasked with obtaining best value upon the disposal of its assets. A number of alternative uses were considered for the site, including industrial uses. However the Board was aware that a residential scheme of some type would provide the best value for the application land, even were that to include a conversion of the existing agricultural building.”

Ms Flanagan goes on to refer to Smiths Gore’s letter of 27 February 2014 (in paragraphs 4 and 5):

“4. ... This letter ... states that at that time [Smith Gore’s] opinion was that it was unlikely that a scheme of conversion would be contemplated by any developer. However, this letter pre-dated the permitted development rights that subsequently came into effect in April 2014. By the time the planning application had formally been submitted, these permitted development rights were in effect.

5. Had no other scheme proven acceptable in planning terms, and if planning permission had been refused for the development the subject of the planning application, the Trust would have built out a “permitted development” scheme to the fullest extent possible in order to realise the highest value for the land, in order to thereafter seek disposal to a developer.”

32. That evidence is wholly unsurprising. And it confirms the East Malling Trust’s intentions as they were when the council made its decision to grant planning permission in January 2016, by which time the current provisions for “permitted development” under Class Q of the GPDO had come into effect. It states the East Malling Trust’s position as landowner at that stage – as opposed to the view expressed by an officer of the council, and an opinion by a marketing agent in a letter to developers, almost two years before. It is consistent with what was being said on behalf of the East Malling Trust in its dealings with the council from the outset – in effect, that the site was going to be redeveloped for housing even if this had to involve the conversion and change of use of the barn to residential use. It reflects the fiduciary duty of the trustees. And it bears out what the council’s officer said about the “fallback position” in his report to committee.

33. I do not see how it can be said that the officer’s assessment of the “fallback position”, which the committee adopted, offends any relevant principle in the case law – in particular the concept of a “real prospect” as explained by Sullivan L.J. in *Samuel Smith Old*

Brewery. It was, in my view, a faithful application of the principles in the authorities in the particular circumstances of this case. It also demonstrates common sense.

34. The officer did not simply consider the fallback in a general way, without regard to the facts. He considered it in specific terms, gauging the likelihood of its being brought about if the council were to reject the present proposal. In the end, of course, these were matters of fact and planning judgment for the committee. But the officer's advice in paragraphs 6.14 to 6.19 of his report was, I believe, impeccable. He was right to say, in paragraph 6.14, that the "new permitted development rights" – under Class Q in the GPDO – would enable the barn to be converted into three residential units; in the same paragraph, that the building "could be physically adapted in certain ways that would allow for partial residential occupation ..."; and, in paragraph 6.15, that the bungalow "could be replaced in accordance with policy CP14 with a new residential building provided that it was not materially larger than the existing building". He was also right to say, therefore, that the site could be developed for "four residential units albeit of a different form and type to that proposed by this application". All of this was factually correct, and represented what the council knew to be so. It did not overstate the position. It went no further than the least that could realistically be achieved by way of a fallback development – through the use of permitted development rights under Class Q and an application for planning permission complying with policy CP14.
35. The officer also guided the committee appropriately in what he said about the realism of the "fallback position". At the end of paragraph 6.15 of his report he said that the fallback development he had described was "a realistic fallback position in terms of how the site could be developed". He was well aware of the need to take into account only a fallback development that was truly "realistic", not merely "theoretical". He came back, in paragraph 6.16, to the question of "realistic 'fallback' positions", again reminding the members that this was what had to be considered. He went on to acknowledge, rightly, that the council had to consider what could be achieved "using permitted development rights for alternative forms of development". The context for this advice was that in his view, as he said in paragraph 6.15, he was dealing with "a realistic fallback position". He went on in paragraph 6.17 to consider what "would" happen if a scheme taking advantage of permitted development rights came forward. And in paragraph 6.18 his advice was that a redevelopment involving the conversion of "the entire barn for residential purposes, above the permitted development thresholds ... would wholly accord with adopted policy". That was a legally sound planning judgment. The same may also be said of the officer's conclusion in paragraph 6.19, where he compared the proposal before the committee with the "more piecemeal form of development that would arise should the applicant seek to undertake to implement permitted development rights".
36. In short, none of the advice given to the council's committee on the "fallback position" can, in the particular circumstances of this case, be criticized. It was, I think, unimpeachable.
37. In my view, therefore, the council was entitled to accept that there was a "real prospect" of the fallback development being implemented, and to give the weight it evidently did to that fallback as a material consideration. In doing so, it made no error of law.

Was the judge right to conclude that the council did not misunderstand or misapply the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” in the NPPF?

38. Paragraph 14 of the NPPF states:

“14. At the heart of [the NPPF] is a presumption in favour of sustainable development, which should be seen as a golden thread running through both plan-making and decision-taking.

...

For decision-taking this means:

- approving development proposals that accord with the development plan without delay; and
- where the development plan is absent, silent or relevant policies are out-of-date, granting permission unless:
 - any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in [the NPPF] taken as a whole; or
 - specific policies in [the NPPF] indicate development should be restricted.”

39. In *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council* this court stated its understanding of the policy for the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” in the NPPF, and how that presumption is intended to operate (see paragraphs 34 and 35 of my judgment). In doing so, it approved the relevant parts of the judgment of Holgate J. in *Trustees of the Barker Mill Estates v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government* [2016] EWHC 3028 (Admin) (in particular paragraphs 126, 131, 136, and 140 to 143). Three simple points emerged (see paragraph 35 of my judgment). The first and second of those three points need not be set out again here. The third, however, is worth repeating – because it bears on the issue we are considering now. I shall emphasize the most important principle for our purposes here:

“ ...

- (3) When the section 38(6) duty is lawfully performed, a development which does not earn the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” – and does not, therefore, have the benefit of the “tilted balance” in its favour – may still merit the grant of planning permission. On the other hand, a development which does have the benefit of the “tilted balance” may still be found unacceptable, and planning permission for it refused This is the territory of planning judgment, where the court will not go except to apply the relevant principles of public law The “presumption in favour of sustainable development” is not irrebuttable. Thus, in a case where a proposal for the development of housing is in conflict with a local plan whose policies for the supply of housing are out of date, the decision-maker is left to judge, in the particular circumstances of the case in hand, how much weight should be given to that conflict. The absence of a five-year supply of housing land will not necessarily be conclusive in favour of the grant of planning permission. This is not a matter of law. It is a matter of planning judgment (see paragraphs 70 to

74 of the judgment in [*Crane v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government* [2015] EWHC 425 (Admin)].”

40. The judgments in this court in *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council* entirely supersede the corresponding parts of several judgments at first instance – including, most recently, *Reigate and Banstead Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government* [2017] EWHC 1562 (Admin). In those cases, judges in the Planning Court have offered various interpretations of NPPF policy for the “presumption in favour of sustainable development”, and have explained how, in their view, the presumption should work. There is no need for that to continue. After the decision of the Court of Appeal in *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council*, it is no longer necessary, or appropriate, to cite to this court or to judges in the Planning Court any of the first instance judgments in which the meaning of the presumption has been considered.
41. The Planning Court – and this court too – must always be vigilant against excessive legalism infecting the planning system. A planning decision is not akin to an adjudication made by a court (see paragraph 50 of my judgment in *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council*). The courts must keep in mind that the function of planning decision-making has been assigned by Parliament, not to judges, but – at local level – to elected councillors with the benefit of advice given to them by planning officers, most of whom are professional planners, and – on appeal – to the Secretary of State and his inspectors. They should remember too that the making of planning policy is not an end in itself, but a means to achieving reasonably predictable decision-making, consistent with the aims of the policy-maker. Though the interpretation of planning policy is, ultimately, a matter for the court, planning policies do not normally require intricate discussion of their meaning. A particular policy, or even a particular phrase or word in a policy, will sometimes provide planning lawyers with a “doctrinal controversy”. But even when the higher courts disagree as to the meaning of the words in dispute, and even when the policy-maker’s own understanding of the policy has not been accepted, the debate in which lawyers have engaged may turn out to have been in vain – because, when a planning decision has to be made, the effect of the relevant policies, taken together, may be exactly the same whichever construction is right (see paragraph 22 of my judgment in *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council*). That of course may not always be so. One thing, however, is certain, and ought to be stressed. Planning officers and inspectors are entitled to expect that both national and local planning policy is as simply and clearly stated as it can be, and also – however well or badly a policy is expressed – that the court’s interpretation of it will be straightforward, without undue or elaborate exposition. Equally, they are entitled to expect – in every case – good sense and fairness in the court’s review of a planning decision, not the hypercritical approach the court is often urged to adopt.
42. The principles on which the court will act when criticism is made of a planning officer’s report to committee are well settled. To summarize the law as it stands:
 - (1) The essential principles are as stated by the Court of Appeal in *R. v Selby District Council, ex parte Oxton Farms* [1997] E.G.C.S. 60 (see, in particular, the judgment of Judge L.J., as he then was). They have since been confirmed several times by this court, notably by Sullivan L.J. in *R. (on the application of Siraj) v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council* [2010] EWCA Civ 1286, at paragraph 19, and applied in many cases at first instance (see, for example, the judgment of Hickinbottom J., as he then was, in *R. (on the application of*

Zurich Assurance Ltd., t/a Threadneedle Property Investments) v North Lincolnshire Council [2012] EWHC 3708 (Admin), at paragraph 15).

- (2) The principles are not complicated. Planning officers' reports to committee are not to be read with undue rigour, but with reasonable benevolence, and bearing in mind that they are written for councillors with local knowledge (see the judgment of Baroness Hale of Richmond in *R. (on the application of Morge) v Hampshire County Council* [2011] UKSC 2, at paragraph 36, and the judgment of Sullivan J., as he then was, in *R. v Mendip District Council, ex parte Fabre* (2000) 80 P. & C.R. 500, at p.509). Unless there is evidence to suggest otherwise, it may reasonably be assumed that, if the members followed the officer's recommendation, they did so on the basis of the advice that he or she gave (see the judgment of Lewison L.J. in *Palmer v Herefordshire Council* [2016] EWCA Civ 1061, at paragraph 7). The question for the court will always be whether, on a fair reading of the report as a whole, the officer has materially misled the members on a matter bearing upon their decision, and the error has gone uncorrected before the decision was made. Minor or inconsequential errors may be excused. It is only if the advice in the officer's report is such as to misdirect the members in a material way – so that, but for the flawed advice it was given, the committee's decision would or might have been different – that the court will be able to conclude that the decision itself was rendered unlawful by that advice.
- (3) Where the line is drawn between an officer's advice that is significantly or seriously misleading – misleading in a material way – and advice that is misleading but not significantly so will always depend on the context and circumstances in which the advice was given, and on the possible consequences of it. There will be cases in which a planning officer has inadvertently led a committee astray by making some significant error of fact (see, for example *R. (on the application of Loader) v Rother District Council* [2016] EWCA Civ 795), or has plainly misdirected the members as to the meaning of a relevant policy (see, for example, *Watermead Parish Council v Aylesbury Vale District Council* [2017] EWCA Civ 152). There will be others where the officer has simply failed to deal with a matter on which the committee ought to receive explicit advice if the local planning authority is to be seen to have performed its decision-making duties in accordance with the law (see, for example, *R. (on the application of Williams) v Powys County Council* [2017] EWCA Civ 427). But unless there is some distinct and material defect in the officer's advice, the court will not interfere.

43. Was the officer's advice to the members in this case flawed in that way? I do not think so.

44. In paragraph 6.1 of his report the officer said:

“6.1 As Members are aware, the Council in its role as Local Planning Authority is required to determine planning applications and other similar submissions in accordance with the Development Plan in force unless material considerations indicate otherwise. ... The NPPF and the associated [Planning Practice Guidance] are important material considerations.”

He went on to consider the relevant policies of the development plan, in particular policies CP11, CP12, CP13 and CP14 of the core strategy, and then advised the committee, in paragraph 6.6:

“6.6 With the above policy context in mind, it is clear that the proposal relates to new development outside the village confines (on land which is not defined as “previously developed” for the purposes of applying NPPF policy), is not part of a wider plan of farm diversification and is not intended to provide affordable housing as an exceptions site. Consequently, the proposed development falls outside of the requirements of these policies and there is an objection to the principle of the proposed development in the broad policy terms.”

and in paragraph 6.7:

“6.7 It is therefore necessary to establish whether any other material planning considerations exist that outweigh the policy objections to the scheme in these particular circumstances.”

45. In paragraph 6.8 the officer acknowledged, in the light of the relevant guidance in the Planning Practice Guidance, that “the policies contained in ... the NPPF are material considerations and must be taken into account”, and, in paragraph 6.9, that since the core strategy had been adopted in 2007 it was “necessary to establish how consistent the above policies are with the policies contained within the NPPF”. His advice in paragraphs 6.10 to 6.13 of his report was this:

“6.10 With this in mind, it must be noted that paragraph 49 of the NPPF states that applications for new housing development should be considered in the context of the presumption in favour of sustainable development. Paragraph 50 of the NPPF emphasises the importance of providing a wide choice of high quality homes, to widen opportunities for home ownership and create sustainable, inclusive and mixed communities. Paragraph 55 states that in order to promote sustainable development in rural areas, housing should be located where it will enhance or maintain the vitality of rural communities.

6.11 These criteria all demonstrate a clear government momentum in favour of sustainable development to create new homes and drive economic development. The proposed development would create four high quality new homes on the very edge of an existing village settlement.

6.12 A further indicator of such emphasis is borne out of the recent changes to the regime of permitted development rights set out by national government by the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 2015. This allows for far more development to take place without the need for planning permission from Local Authorities and generally provides a steer as to government’s thinking on how to boost the country’s economy through the delivery of new homes.

6.13 Such continued emphasis from government is a material consideration that must be balanced against the policy context set out in the TMBCS.”

46. I have already referred to the officer's advice on the "fallback position" in paragraphs 6.14 to 6.19 of his report. In paragraphs 6.20 to 6.42 he considered the planning merits of the proposal and its advantages by comparison with the fallback development, drawing the committee's attention to relevant policies both in the core strategy and in the NPPF. He advised that the design and density of the proposed development were acceptable and beneficial (paragraphs 6.20 to 6.23). In paragraph 6.24 he said:

"6.24 With these considerations in mind, particularly the emphasis contained within the NPPF concerning sustainable development generally, the impetus behind the provision of new homes, the benefits of removing existing structures and the permitted development "fallback" position, it is my view that, on balance, other material considerations can weigh in favour of the grant of planning permission."

47. He concluded that the effects of the development on the settings of listed buildings and the setting of East Malling Conservation Area would not be harmful (paragraphs 6.25 to 6.30). He also found the proposed arrangements for access to the site and for car parking acceptable (paragraphs 6.31 to 6.36). He advised that "... the existing barn could be partially converted and the existing access retained for use by those units which arguably could have a greater impact on amenity in terms of activity, noise and disturbance than the proposed development simply by virtue of the greater degree of proximity to the existing residential properties" (paragraph 6.33). He told the committee that in his view it "would be counterproductive to seek affordable housing contributions as this would merely limit the ability of the Trust to recycle funds to provide wider support for the Trust" (paragraph 6.37). And the loss of Grade 2 agricultural land was "not ... a justifiable reason to refuse planning permission ..." (paragraph 6.39).

48. The final paragraph of the officer's report is paragraph 6.42, where he said this:

"6.42 In conclusion, it is important to understand that the starting point for the determination of this planning application rests with the adopted Development Plan. Against that starting point there are other material planning considerations that must be given appropriate regard, not least the requirements set out within the NPPF which is an important material consideration and the planning and design of the proposal for the site in the context of the permitted development fallback position. The weight to attribute to each of those other material planning considerations, on an individual and cumulative basis, and the overall balance is ultimately a matter of judgement for the Planning Committee. My view is that the balance can lie in favour of granting planning permission."

49. In recording the argument on this issue in the court below, Garnham J. noted Ms Graham Paul's submission that "the presumption in favour of sustainable development set out in paragraph 14 of [the NPPF] was not operative" in this case – because the development plan was in place and up-to-date and the council was able to demonstrate a five-year supply of deliverable housing sites (paragraph 43 of the judgment). Ms Graham Paul had conceded that "sustainability may be capable of being a material consideration in considering a conflict with a development plan". What the officer had done in paragraph 6.10 of his report, said the judge, had been "to invite the committee to note the effect of paragraphs 49, 50 and 55 [of the NPPF]". It was not suggested that those paragraphs of the

NPPF had been misrepresented. Nor was it suggested that the officer had failed to point out that the proposed development “fell outside the local plan”; he had done that in paragraph 6.6 of his report. In those circumstances, said the judge, “it cannot sensibly be argued that the officer misled the committee in any material respect” (paragraph 47). The judge also rejected the submission that paragraphs 49, 50 and 55 of the NPPF were irrelevant. He observed that the NPPF “provides for a presumption in favour of sustainable development which it says should be seen “as a golden thread” running through decision-taking”. He added that “[the] weight to be given to those considerations in any given case is a matter for the planning authority but it cannot, at least on facts such as the present, be said that the underlying principle is irrelevant” (paragraph 48). He rejected the submission that the officer had not justified the departure from the development plan. The officer’s report, he said, “accurately and fairly sets out the competing considerations and it was a matter for the judgment of the planning authority how those considerations were resolved” (paragraph 49).

50. In the submissions they made to us at the hearing, though not in their respective skeleton arguments, both Ms Graham Paul and Mr Lopez recast their arguments in the light of what this court has now said about the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” in *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council*, including the basic point that the presumption is contained solely in paragraph 14 of the NPPF (see paragraph 35 of my judgment in that appeal). They were right to do so.
51. It was common ground before us, as it was in the court below, that the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” did not apply to the proposal. And the council’s officer did not advise the committee that it did. As Ms Graham Paul acknowledged, the only reference to the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” in the officer’s report is in the first sentence of paragraph 6.10. But, she submitted, in view of what the officer said in that paragraph of the report, and also in paragraph 6.42, we should conclude that the committee took the presumption into account as a material consideration, which it ought it not to have done. Ms Graham Paul did not submit that the proposal was given the benefit of the so called “tilted balance”. But she argued that the effect of the officer’s advice was that the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” was one of the “requirements set out within the NPPF ...”, which the officer treated as “an important material consideration” and a significant factor weighing in favour of the proposal in the planning balance.
52. I disagree. In my view the argument fails on a straightforward reading of the officer’s report, in the light of the judgments in this court in *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council*. I do not accept that the officer counted the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” as a material consideration weighing in favour of planning permission being granted.
53. The reference to the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” in paragraph 6.10 of the officer’s report is a quotation of the first sentence of paragraph 49 of the NPPF, not of paragraph 14. The quotation is correct. In the same paragraph of the report the officer also referred to two other passages of policy in the NPPF, namely paragraphs 50 and 55. The policies are correctly summarized. The common factor in those three passages of NPPF policy is not the “presumption in favour of sustainable development”. It is the promotion, in national planning policy, of sustainable housing development. That this is

what the officer had in mind in this part of the report is very clear from what he went on to say in paragraphs 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13, and then in paragraph 6.24.

54. In those paragraphs the officer was not purporting to apply the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” to the proposal. Nor did he advise the committee that the presumption was engaged, or that it was, in itself, a material consideration weighing in favour of the proposal. He referred, in paragraph 6.11, to “[these] criteria” – meaning the matters to which he had referred in paragraph 6.10 – as demonstrating “a clear government momentum in favour of sustainable development to create new homes and drive economic development”; in paragraphs 6.12 and 6.13 respectively, to “such emphasis” and “[such] continued emphasis from government”; and in paragraph 6.24 to “the emphasis contained within the NPPF concerning sustainable development generally ...” (my underlining). The language in those paragraphs is very distinctly not the language one would have expected the officer to have used if he thought he was applying the “presumption in favour of sustainable development”. The intervening and subsequent assessment, culminating in his final conclusion on the planning merits of the proposal in paragraph 6.42, is concerned with its credentials and benefits – and advantages when compared with the fallback – as sustainable development.
55. Paragraph 6.42 of the officer’s report does not, in my view, betray a misunderstanding of NPPF policy for the “presumption in favour of sustainable development”. The advice given to the committee in that paragraph was not inaccurate or misleading. The officer did not undertake the planning balance in terms of the policy for “decision-taking” in paragraph 14 of the NPPF. There can be no suggestion that, contrary to his earlier conclusion and advice in paragraphs 6.6 and 6.7 of his report, he was treating this as a case in which the proposal accorded with the development plan, so that it was to be approved “without delay” under the first limb of the policy for “decision-taking” in paragraph 14. Nor can it be suggested that, contrary to the whole tenor of his assessment of the proposal in paragraphs 6.1 to 6.41, this was a case in which the development plan was “absent” or “silent” or any “relevant policies” of it were “out-of-date”, so that the second limb of the policy for “decision-taking” in paragraph 14 applied.
56. This case is clearly and materially different from *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council* – a case that shows what can go wrong when a decision-maker is misled as to the meaning and effect of government policy for the “presumption in favour of sustainable development”. Here the officer did not commit an error of the kind made by the inspector – and conceded by the Secretary of State – in that case: the mistake of discerning a “presumption in favour of sustainable development” outside paragraph 14 of the NPPF and treating that wider presumption as a material consideration weighing in favour of the proposal (see paragraphs 43 to 48 of my judgment in *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council*). The officer did not say, as the inspector did in *Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council*, that “where a proposal is contrary to the development plan [the “presumption in favour of sustainable development”] is a material consideration that should be taken into account” (paragraph 12 of the decision letter in that case). Unlike the inspector in that case (in paragraphs 37 to 41 of his decision letter), he did not bring the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” into the balancing exercise as a material consideration (see paragraphs 26 and 29 of my judgment). And, in my opinion, it cannot realistically be suggested that the members would have thought they were being invited to apply that presumption in government policy, or to give it weight as a material consideration, in their assessment of the proposal.

57. The “presumption in favour of sustainable development” did not, in fact, feature as a material consideration to which the officer gave any positive weight when undertaking the planning balance. The exercise he conducted in paragraph 6.42 of his report was an entirely conventional and lawful balance of other material considerations against the identified conflict with the development plan, as section 38(6) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 requires. It was, in fact, a classic example of that provision in practice. This is not to say that in his assessment of the proposal he had to refrain from considering the extent to which it complied with relevant NPPF policies – in particular, in the specific respects to which he referred, the sustainability of the proposed development in the light of NPPF policy, as well as its compliance with relevant policies of the development plan. That was a perfectly legitimate, and necessary, part of the planning assessment in this case. Had the officer left it out, he would have been in error, because he would then have been failing to have regard to material considerations. But he did not make that mistake. He assessed the proposal comprehensively on its planning merits, exercising his planning judgment on the relevant planning issues. He took into account the sustainability of the proposed development in the light of NPPF policy, but without giving it the added impetus of the “presumption in favour of sustainable development”. I cannot fault the advice he gave.
58. Finally on this issue, I do not accept the suggestion made by Ms Graham Paul in reply that the council’s response to Mr Mansell’s solicitors’ pre-application protocol letter, in its solicitors’ letter dated 22 February 2016, can be read as conceding the error for which Ms Graham Paul contended. In fact, it squarely denied that error. Having referred to the quotation of the first sentence of paragraph 49 of the NPPF in paragraph 6.10 of the officer’s report, it acknowledged that the proposal was a “departure from the development plan” and that the development plan was not “absent” or “silent” nor were relevant policies “out-of-date”. It then said that neither the officer nor the committee had treated the “presumption in favour of sustainable development” under paragraph 14 of the NPPF as “operative” in this case. It acknowledged, therefore, that neither of the limbs of the policy for “decision-taking” in paragraph 14 of the NPPF could have applied here. And it said that the officer’s report “does not begin to suggest otherwise”. I agree.
59. It follows that this ground of appeal must also fail.

Conclusion

60. For the reasons I have give, I would dismiss this appeal.

Lord Justice Hickinbottom

61. I agree with both judgments. Without diminishing my concurrence with anything my Lords have said, I would wish expressly to endorse the observations of Lindblom L.J. in paragraphs 39-40 to the effect that, in future, reference to pre-*Barwood v East Staffordshire Borough Council* authorities on the meaning and operation of the presumption in paragraph 14 of the NPPF should be avoided; and in paragraph 41, supported by the further comments of the Chancellor, on the respective roles of planning decision-makers and the courts in planning cases.

The Chancellor of the High Court

62. I too agree with Lord Justice Lindblom's judgment, but would add a few words from a more general perspective. In the course of the argument, one could have been forgiven for thinking that the contention that the presumption in favour of sustainable development in the NPPF had been misapplied in the planning officer's report turned on a minute legalistic dissection of that report. It cannot be over-emphasised that such an approach is wrong and inappropriate. As has so often been said, planning decisions are to be made by the members of the Planning Committee advised by planning officers. In making their decisions, they must exercise their own planning judgment and the courts must give them space to undertake that process.
63. Appeals should not, in future, be mounted on the basis of a legalistic analysis of the different formulations adopted in a planning officer's report. An appeal will only succeed, as Lindblom L.J. has said, if there is some distinct and material defect in the report. Such reports are not, and should not be, written for lawyers, but for councillors who are well-versed in local affairs and local factors. Planning committees approach such reports utilising that local knowledge and much common-sense. They should be allowed to make their judgments freely and fairly without undue interference by courts or judges who have picked apart the planning officer's advice on which they relied.
64. It is also appropriate to reiterate what Lindblom L.J. said at paragraph 35 of the *East Staffordshire* case to the effect that planning decision-makers have to exercise planning judgment as much when the presumption in favour of sustainable development is applicable as they do when it is not. The presumption may be rebutted when it is applicable, and planning permission may be granted where it is not. In each case, the decision-makers must use their judgment to decide where the planning balance lies based on material considerations. It is not for the court to second guess that planning judgment once it is exercised, unless as I have said it is based on a distinct and material defect in the report.
65. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed.